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Executive Summary
Economists have greatly criticized regulations that impose uniform environmental standards on plants which may differ in terms both of their marginal abatement cost and marginal damage functions. Such a critic ignores however that the implementation of the standards may vary significantly across plants thus giving rise in fact to non-uniform standards. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the regulator's monitoring activities, and the factors which explains the decision to inspect or not to inspect a plant's environmental performance. We show that regulators are sensitive to local environmental damages in their decision to inspect specific plants and that greater inspection effort, ceteris paribus, is allocated towards those plants whose emissions are likely to generate a higher level of damages. Hence, local monitoring and enforcement of national standards effectively determine the price of pollution in each area. While national standards, as defined by regulations and legislation are uniform, the implementation of those standards is in fact a function of local conditions. Ceteris paribus, this finding indicates that local enforcers may redirect resources in a way that may approximate optimal behavior. A clear policy implication of this finding is the following: Ignoring that these trade-offs are taking place at the local levels may undermine and in fact render ineffective regulatory and policy reforms targeted solely at the national level. It is interesting to note that a similar result has been observed in China (see Wang and Wheeler, Policy Research Working Paper 1644). We would expect this finding to be robust to other countries and institutional settings. This finding gives support to the public interest theory of regulation which views the regulator as an agent whose objective is to maximize social welfare.
On the other hand, we also show that the behavior of the regulator is also a function of variables that may not be directly related to abatement cost and damages. In particular, we show that variables pertaining to local labor market conditions have an impact on the monitoring strategy adopted by the regulator. This result provides support to the economic theory of regulation which views the regulator as an agent whose behavior can1.
Introduction
Economists have greatly criticized environmental regulations that impose on polluters uniform environmental standards since such standards ignore that plants face non-uniform marginal abatement cost, as well as non-uniform marginal damage functions. However, the presence of uniform standards does not necessarily imply uniform compliance with the standards. The nature of the monitoring and enforcement activities performed by the regulator ultimately determines the extent of pollution control undertaken by the plants and their level of compliance with the regulation.' If compliance with the terms of the regulation imposes any net cost on a plant, its behavior is likely to diverge from the desired one unless the cost of compliance is smaller than the expected cost of non-compliance. 2 It has been increasingly recognized that resources devoted to the monitoring of the regulated community and the enforcement of environmental standards are insufficient, and that these activities are seriously lacking. 3 The regulator therefore has to allocate its limited resources to perform a small number of compliance activities. Silverman (1990) writes: "Because of limited resources and the resulting need to establish priorities, each EPA program at agency headquarters in Washington D.C. has developed compliance monitoring plans and enforcement response policies. These strategies generally direct the most intensive efforts to those segments of the regulated community most likely to be in non-compliance" (p. 95; italics ours). In the context, the use of the word "generally" takes Russell (1990) defines monitoring as "checking up on whether those covered by the law and regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or forbidden to) them." (p. 243) Enforcement is defined as "taking actions that force violators to mend their ways and that provide visible examples to encourage others in the regulated population to maintain desired behavior to avoid a similar fate." (p. 243) Penalties for non-compliance may take various forms, including legal costs, fines, loss of reputation, etc. For more details, see Dewees (1990) , Hamilton (1995) , Lanoie and Laplante (1994) , and Muoghalu et al. (1990) . Russell (1990) writes: "What is missing is a commitment of resources to checking up on whether those covered by the law and regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or forbidden) them" (p. 243). See also General Accounting Office (1993), and O'Connor (1994) . a special importance since it represents an implicit recognition that universal compliance may not be the objective of the regulator. Similarly in Canada, "upon evaluating the results of the National Inspection Plan, Environment Canada found that all regulations did not require the same level of compliance verification, and decided on a target-oriented approach" (Canada, 1992, p. 38) .
Surprisingly, issues pertaining to the monitoring and enforcement of environmental standards has been the object of very few empirical analysis. 4 Magat and Viscusi (1990) have estimated the impact of inspections on the self-reported discharges of biological oxygen demand (BOD) of pulp and paper plants in the United States, and found that each inspection reduces permanently reported discharges by approximately 20%. More recently, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have found that not only inspections but also the threat of an inspection has a strong negative impact on reported emissions.
Both analyses also found that inspections induce more frequent reporting from the plants. 5 Given that inspections may induce plants to improve their environmental performance, it is of interest to understand the process leading the regulator to undertake monitoring activities. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the regulator's decision to monitor (or not to monitor) a plant's environmental performance.
In particular, we have built a measure of environmental damages to test whether or not greater inspection effort, ceteris paribus, is allocated towards those plants whose emissions are likely to generate a higher level of damages. On the other hand, we also test 4 We note, along with Cropper and Oates (1992) , that most of the literature in environmental economics simply makes the (implicit or explicit) assumption that polluters comply with the regulation. Research effort on monitoring and enforcement issues has been for the most part theoretical (see for example, Beavis and Dobbs (1987) , Linder and McBride (1984) , and Russell et al. (1986) ). Fisheries have attracted a certain number of empirical analysis (among others, see Furlong (1991) , and Sutinen and Andersen (1985) ). See also Feamley et al. (1995) .
whether or not the behavior of the regulator is a function of variables that may not be directly related to abatement cost and damages. We are particularly interested in testing whether or not variables pertaining to local labor market conditions (e.g. regional unemployment) has an impact on the monitoring strategy adopted by the regulator.
The paper most closely related to ours is Deily and Gray (1991) . 6 Using solely the economic (or positive) theory of regulation as a reference model (Stigler (1971) , Peltzman (1976) ), they analyze whether or not local labor market conditions affect the enforcement of environmental standards. 7 In particular, they analyze whether or not EPA's enforcement actions are a function of the probability that a plant closes as a result of these actions instead of complying with the regulation. In a recent paper, Deily and Gray (1996) also use the economic theory of regulation to model the regulator's enforcement decision. As will be shown in Section III, we obtain results converse to those obtained by Deily and Gray. Moreover, unlike Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) who did not perform such a test, we show that greater inspection efforts are directed towards those plants most likely to cause higher levels of damages. This result lends support to the public interest (or normative) theory of regulation (Posner, 1974) .
Given the limited number of empirical analysis in this area of research, we view our analysis as broadening further our understanding of the regulator's behavior with respect to the monitoring and enforcement of environmental standards. Our results indicate that unlike standards, the implementation of those standards is not uniform. To the extent that higher expected damages lead to a greater probability of inspections, actual standards may be closer to optimality than would suggest the regulation. Moreover, given the specificities of our model, the current paper extends Deily and Gray's analysis (1991, Interestingly, Deily and Gray assert that their paper is "the first empirical study of the EPA's enforcement activity at the plant level" (p. 260). This theory stipulates that there is a supply and demand of regulation, and that the government chooses the amount of regulation so as to maximize its political support.
3 1996) to a test of the validity of the competing theories of regulation when applied to environmental issues. 8 Our paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss in more details our model, estimation strategy, and the nature of our dataset. We present our results in Section III and conclude in Section IV.
2.
Model, estimation and dataset
(i) Model
Our purpose is to analyze the factors that explain the regulator's decision to monitor a plant's environmental performance. Assume that a regulation is in place which restricts discharges of a given subset of industrial polluters (as most environmental standards are industry specific). Assume moreover that limited resources are devoted to monitoring compliance with the regulation. How is the regulator going to allocate its monitoring resources? As suggested by Silverman (1990) , the regulator may wish to allocate its resources to maximize the rate of compliance with the regulation. If such is an objective, monitoring activities would obviously be a function of a plant's compliance history. In particular, a high frequency of non-compliance may trigger an inspection by the regulator. However, such a strategy would presume that compliance is equally desirable regardless of the impact of a plant's emissions on the environment. It would ignore that the impact of a plant's emissions is a function of the specificities of the environment in which they are discharged.
With respect to effluent discharges, for any given concentration of conventional pollutants (such as BOD and total suspended solids (TSS)), the environmental impact is a function of the flow of the effluents relative to the flow of the river in which the effluent is discharged: ceteris paribus, the greater the river flow, the smaller the environmental 8
To our knowledge, such a test has only been performed by Kaserman et al. (1993) .
impact. Hence, given that the impact of a unit of pollution may vary considerably across locations, the regulator may wish to allocate its resources not so much as to increase compliance with the regulation but instead to minimize environmental damages. This behavior would support the public interest (or normative) theory of regulation which, applied to this particular instance, would explain environmental regulation as an instrument that corrects market failure and increases social welfare (Posner, 1974) . Given this interpretation of the regulation, the regulator's monitoring strategy would, ceteris paribus, be explicitly affected by the fact that damages are heterogeneous across locations, and at least implicitly would allow higher discharges (through lower probabilities of inspections) in locations where damages are smaller.
However, other variables may also affect the regulator's behavior. If one espouses the economic (or positive) theory of regulation, the regulator would allocate monitoring resources so as to maximize net political support. On this basis, Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) predict that local employment conditions would particularly influence enforcement actions. Enforcement actions in Deily and Gray include letters, phone calls, penalties, enforcement orders, inspections, etc. Monitoring activities (e.g. inspections) are not differentiated from enforcement activities (e.g. orders and fines). In particular, they predict that plants in high unemployment areas would be the target of a smaller number of enforcement actions than plants in lower unemployment areas. However, somewhat surprisingly they find that "plants in high-unemployment counties are facing more enforcement actions than fewer." (1991, p. 269). Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) also predict that large plants (relative to the community labor force) would face a smaller number of enforcement actions since it may prove too costly for the regulator to disrupt a large proportion of the labor force (where the cost is measured in terms of political support). An alternative view however is that in order to maximize political support, the regulator may trade-off the support of those concerned with environmental quality with those whose income is an important function of the economic activity generated by the presence of a large (polluting) plant. Support from an environmentally aware community may be obtained by the undertaking of "visible" monitoring activities such as inspections, (irrespective of whether or not these inspections give rise to enforcement actions), while support from the group who benefits largely from the presence of the plant may be obtained by engaging into less enforcement actions. Hence, unlike Deily and Gray, we therefore predict that the "visibility" of the plants may affect the probability that it being monitored: the greater the visibility (measured as the importance of the plant in the local labor market), the larger the probability of inspections. Whether or not large plants in the local labor market face a smaller or a larger number of monitoring actions therefore remain an empirical issue.
Following the preceding discussion, we therefore seek to explain the regulator's monitoring activities by using a model specification which includes variables that could support both the normative and positive theory of regulation:
MONITORING = f (LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, DAMAGE OF POLLUTION, COMPLIANCE, CONTROL VARIABLES) (ii) Estimation strategy and data
For the purpose of our econometric analysis, we use plant-level monthly data from the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. The industry is a major contributor to Quebec's economic activity and is also its most important source of conventional pollutants, producing approximately 60% of the total BOD load produced by the manufacturing industry in Quebec. In Canada, jurisdiction over water pollution control is shared by the federal and provincial governments. The basis of the overlap relies on the Constitution Act of 1867. Insofar as water pollution is concerned, the federal government has played an important role through its "Fisheries Act" under which it has introduced the "Pulp and Paper
Effluent Regulations" in 1971. Similarly, the government of Quebec, pursuant to its "Environmental Quality Act", has introduced the "Reglement sur les fabriques de pates at papiers" in 1981. As of May 1992, new federal and provincial regulations were introduced for the pulp and paper industry whereby new emission standards for TSS, BOD, toxicity, 6 dioxins and furans have been defined. However, for the period covered by our sample of data (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) For more details, see Laplante and Rilstone (1996) .
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Observations were missing from the monthly reports filed by the plants. In a number of cases, the neglect to report seemed to be unsystematic. These observations were treated as randomly missing and were replaced by forecasts from 12th-order univariate autoregressions. This left us with 46 of the 60 plants.
As for the plants not included in our dataset, Laplante and Rilstone (1996) have shown that the failure to report does not appear to be the result of a strategic behavior from the plants. A sampling inspection is an inspection where the regulator sarnples the plant's effluents and measures the content of the samples. Other types of monitoring activities are also performed (see Magat and Viscusi (1990, p.338 ) for more details).
We have tried to document monitoring activities other than sampling inspections. However, in Quebec, during the period considered, monitoring activities were performed on a regional basis and it proved impossible to obtain comparable information across regions. It does remain the case that sampling inspections are the regulator's ultimate device to assess compliance with the standard and give credibility to the self-reporting procedure. The LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS are captured by a vector of three variables similar to those used by Deily and Gray. First, EMPL is defined as the ratio of employment at the plant to employment in the local labor market. Following our previous discussion, we expect a positive effect of this variable on the probability of an inspection: the larger the plant in the regional labor market, the more visible is the regulator's monitoring activities in the community. Political support may thus be more favorable from the constituents for whom environmental protection is an important determinant of their political support. Second, UJNEMPL is the regional unemployment rate as defined and measured by Statistic Canada. Third, AGE represents the age of the plant. It reflects 12 The size of the local labor market is defined as the labor force within 100 km from the plant.
(admittedly crudely) the costs that a plant could face if non-compliance was detected, and therefore the potential impact on employment if a large plant is requested to reduce its emissions. We expect that each of these last two variables will have a negative impact on the probability of an inspection.
As a measure of the DAMAGE OF POLLUTION, we use 4 different variables:
FLOW, ORGANO, POP, and ZONE. The variable FLOW represents the flow of the plant's effluent relative to the river flow. Conversations with experts in the Quebec Ministry of the Environment assured us that such a variable captures in a simple and reasonable way the potential of a plant's effluent to cause environmental damages. We expect this variable to have a positive impact on the probability of inspection: the larger the FLOW variable, the greater the potential for damages, and the higher the probability of an inspection. While this variable may capture the potential for conventional pollutants to cause damages, it ignores that the potential for organochlorides such as dioxins and furans to cause damages may not be affected in a same manner by the river flow. We have thus introduced the variable ORGANO which takes the value I if a plant's effluents contains such pollutants.
While emissions of pollutants likely reduce water ambient quality, the damages suffered from such reduction are a function of the various uses that can be made of the water. Ideally, we would have liked to estimate the economic value of the portion of the river affected by the plant's discharges and predict that the higher this value, the larger the probability of an inspection. Given the large number of rivers in which the plants in our sample are discharging, such an exercise would not have been feasible. Following discussion with the Ministry of the Enviromnent, we have decided to consider as a proxy for damages, the population of the city in which the plant is located, only to the extent that the plant discharges its effluent upstream the location of the population (POPUL). If the plant's outlet(s) is located downstream the city, the variable takes the value 0.13 Finally, we
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Short of measuring the economic value of the river, we wished to estimate the number of people living within a given distance (e.g. 15 km) downstream the plant's discharge point(s). However, the required distance would itself have been a have constructed a general index of environmental pressure for each river in which pulp and paper plants are discharging their effluents. We expect that the higher the environmental pressure, the more damaging could be a plant's effluents, and therefore the greater the probability of an inspection. We first calculated the following ratio: ((industrial wastewater discharges + domestic wastewater discharges) / flow of the river). We then have constructed an index ZONE which gives a value between 1 and 5 to the ratio calculated above with 1 representing an area of low pressure, and 5 an area of very high pressure.
We have also included a variable INCOME which measures the average household income within 100 km of the plant. We expect that the higher the level of income, the greater the demand for a cleaner environment, and the larger the probability of monitoring of the plant's environmental perfornance. It is interesting to note that this variable may give support to both theories of regulation. Following the public interest theory of regulation, ceteris paribus higher levels of income give rise to a higher valuation of the environmental damages and therefore to a smaller level of optimal pollution for any given levels of abatement cost. On the other hand, following the economic theory of regulation, communities with higher level of income may be more adept at exercising pressure on the regulator to reduce pollution emissions (higher demand for regulation).
COMPLIANCE is captured by the number of months that the plant was in compliance with BOD and TSS standards during the last twelve months. We therefore have two variables labeled COMPBOD and COMPTSS; they should have a negative influence on the probability of an inspection.
As discussed previously, if the LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS variables have a strong explanatory power, this would lend some support to the economic theory of regulation, while if the DAMAGE OF POLLUTION and the COMPLIANCE variables have more explanatory power, this would support the public interest theory of regulation. function of the river flow. A dispersion model for each river would then have been necessary to estimate the correct distance to include in the calculation for each plant. These models are lacking.
Finally, we consider two sets of CONTROL VARIABLES. The first one is included to capture the differences in monitoring effort across administrative regions. For this purpose, we use either REGIONAL DUMMIES or, as in Deily and Gray, a variable labeled INSPREG which measures the total number of inspections within a region in a given year. The second set of control variables is included to capture omitted influences that may vary across time, but not across regions. For instance, greater public awareness of environmental issues through the period may have led to an increase in monitoring effort.
These influences are captured either by YEARLY DUMMIES or a TIME TREND.
Given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable,14 we use the probit model for our estimations. 15 Different specifications are presented with various control variables.
Furthermore, experimentations were conducted with different lags of the FLOW variable up to (t-6). The justification for this lies on the rationale that there may be a time lag between higher level of damages and the timing of an inspection. This is particularly true when using monthly data, with plants having to self-report their production and discharges data on a monthly basis.
3.

Empirical results
We have first estimated different combinations of the control variables to account for regional effects (REGIONAL DUMMIES and INSPREG) and time (YEARLY DUMMIES and TIME TREND). With respect to regional effects, REGIONAL DUMMIES appeared to be never significant while INSPREG was always statistically significant. We thus present results using INSPREG. With respect to time, both YEARLY DUMMIES and 14 There is no plant in our sample that had more than one inspection in a given month.
We have tested a probit model with fixed effects (unconstrained model) by adding 45 dummies for plants, 11 dummies for months, and 6 dummies for years. None of these variables were statistically significant. We have also conducted a test of maximum likelihood. Results have shown that the unconstrained model was not preferable to the constrained version presented here. TIME TREND were not significant. However, models with YEARLY DUMMIES were always performing better and we therefore keep this specification (results from various specifications are presented in Appendix 1).
Results are presented in Table 2 . The first specification is a version analogous to Deily and Gray (1991) omitting the variables that capture the damage of pollution. the result of our basic model. The following specifications include various lags of the FLOW variable: FLOWt (2); FLOWt-l (3); FLOWt-2 (4); FLOWt-3 (5); FLOWt4 (6). Results show that the explanatory power of the model is relatively high with a percentage of correct predictions above 80%. For the purpose of our discussion, we will focus on the last four specifications which offer the largest percentage of correct predictions. ' 6 First note that the AGE variable is never significant and that its sign is unstable. To the extent that this variable may be use as a proxy for the cost of compliance, this result would indicate that the regulator does not consider compliance costs when allocating its monitoring resources across plants. It is interesting to note that Deily and Gray (1996) obtain a result of a similar nature. With respect to the variables pertaining to LOCAL EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS, we observe that the coefficient of the EMPL variable is always positive and statistically significant thus indicating that the more important the plant is in the local labor market, or in other words the more "visible" is the plant, the greater the probability of inspections: an increase of 1% in the variable EMPL increases the probability of inspection by 0.1135 %. As pointed out earlier, Deily and Gray (1991) reluctant to impose enforcement actions on those some plants which may be more adept at challenging the regulator or, as suggested by Deily and Gray, whose closure would be most disrupting to the local labor market. 
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The coefficient of our variable UNEMPL is as expected of a negative sign, and statistically significant for most specifications: the larger the level of unemployment in a region, the smaller the probability of inspections. Deily and Gray (1991) somewhat surprisingly obtained the converse result. They explain their result by suggesting that "to the extent that high-unemployment areas tend to be more populous or more polluted, the benefits from reducing emissions in such areas may be greater" (p. 270).
With respect to the variables capturing the impact of DAMAGE OF POLLUTION, the coefficient of the variable FLOW is positive as we predicted using the public interest theory of regulation, and is statistically significant when the variable is lagged 3 or 4
periods: an increase of 1% in the value of the ratio increase the probability of inspections by 0.00089. The maximization of social welfare would indeed indicate that plants whose discharges may create higher environmental damages face a higher probability of inspections. We cannot clearly explain why only the lagged value of the FLOW variable is significant. We note however that there is typically a period of a few months between the time when plants submit their discharge reports and the time when this information becomes available to local enforcers for actions.
Coefficients of the variables INCOME and ORGANO are never significant. The coefficient on the variable POPAVAL is unexpectedly negative and in most circumstances not significant. This indicates to us that a more precise proxy for the potential damages caused by a plant's effluent would need to be developed in order to test more precisely the impact of damages on monitoring activities. In this particular instance, we suggest that the use of the portion of each river along which pulp and paper plants are discharging should be precisely documented and analysed.
The variable capturing the number of months that the plant was in compliance with BOD environmental standards in the previous 12 months, COMPBOD, is sometimes significant with the expected negative sign: a greater frequency of non-compliance with BOD standards increases the probability of inspections. However, the variable COMPTSS has an unexpected positive sign but is never significant. This may suggest that the performance of a plant with respect to BOD is more likely to influence the regulator's behavior than its performance with respect to TSS (a similar result is found in Laplante and Rilstone (1996) ). It also suggests that inspections are not purely random and that they tend to be concentrated where non-compliance (with BOD standards) is more important, as suggested by Silverman (1990) .
This evidence suggests that both the public interest theory of regulation and the economic theory of regulation contribute to explain the decision of the regulator to monitor the environmental performance of regulated plants. In a sense, such results indicate pragmatically that both theories may be complementary, or that the "real" world is neither totally black or totally white. This contrasts with the results presented by Kaserman et al. (1993) whose empirical test strongly supports the economic theory of regulation.
Conclusion
Though environmental regulations impose uniform standards on plants that are facing heterogeneous local conditions (such as environmental damages and labor market conditions), results in this paper suggest that the monitoring of those standards is responsive to this heterogeneity. Ceteris paribus, plants whose emissions are most likely to impose high environmental damages are facing a higher probability of being inspected; similarly, the probability of an inspection appears to be an increasing function of the visibility of the plant and a decreasing function of the regional unemployment rate. We do believe that these results offer important insights into the regulator's behavior. First, it does suggest that regulators, facing limited resources, do not blindly enforce uniform standards as set and required by environmental regulation: ceteris paribus, monitoring effort is likely to be higher where environmental damages are higher. This result would suggest that it may be less costly to set (sub-optimal) uniform standards and let enforcers take care of the specificities of local conditions, instead of setting standards that reflect those specificities and letting no room to the enforcers to deviate from the standards.
Secondly, we have shown that regulators do respond to both the visibility of the plant in 
